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ABSTRACT
The Tor anonymity network is difficult to measure because,
if not done carefully, measurements could risk the privacy
(and potentially the safety) of the network’s users. Recent
work has proposed the use of differential privacy and secure
aggregation techniques to safely measure Tor, and prelimi-
nary proof-of-concept prototype tools have been developed
in order to demonstrate the utility of these techniques. In this
work, we significantly enhance two such tools—PrivCount
and Private Set-Union Cardinality—in order to support the
safe exploration of new types of Tor usage behavior that have
never before been measured. Using the enhanced tools, we
conduct a detailed measurement study of Tor covering three
major aspects of Tor usage: how many users connect to Tor
and from where do they connect, with which destinations do
users most frequently communicate, and how many onion
services exist and how are they used. Our findings include
that Tor has ∼8 million daily users (a factor of four more
than previously believed) while Tor user IPs turn over al-
most twice in a 4 day period. We also find that ∼40% of the
sites accessed over Tor have a torproject.org domain name,
∼10% of the sites have an amazon.com domain name, and
∼80% of the sites have a domain name that is included in
the Alexa top 1 million sites list. Finally, we find that ∼90%
of lookups for onion addresses are invalid, and more than
90% of attempted connections to onion services fail.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Tor network has been in operation since 2003 [18],
enabling millions of daily users [43] to anonymously ac-
cess the Internet. Despite its relative longevity, grow-
ing popularity, and prominence as a privacy-enhancing
communication tool, surprisingly little is known about
who uses Tor and how they use it.
Challenges in Measuring Tor. The primary chal-
lenge in conducting measurements on the Tor network
is that, if not done with extreme care, they can im-
pose significant risk to the network’s users. The col-
lection of statistical information implies the need to
∗Equally credited authors.
store data about clients, traffic patterns, sites visited,
etc.—information that may otherwise not be collected
for privacy reasons. Even if the entities collecting this
information are honest, the exposure of the data (e.g.,
through machine compromise or compulsion from gov-
ernment authorities) could pose serious privacy risks.
Additionally, the dissemination of even highly aggre-
gated measurement information risks users’ privacy since
adversaries could potentially combine this data with
background knowledge (e.g., when a tweet was posted,
ISP logs showing user accesses to the Tor network, etc.)
to deanonymize users [16].
In addition to user privacy and safety, monitoring
communication is antithetical to the mission of the Tor
network. For this reason, the Tor Metrics Portal [43],
a data repository that archives information about the
anonymity network’s size, makeup, and capacity, pro-
vides only a limited number of statistics, many of which
are based on indirect measurements and assumptions of
Tor client behavior. We demonstrate in this paper that
some of Tor’s estimates do not correlate well with our
own direct observations of user behavior.
Other efforts to measure Tor, such as those that record
packets at Tor’s ingress and egress points, can pose se-
rious ethical and legal issues: they rely on unsafe [41]
(and potentially unlawful [40]) techniques that would
be difficult to repeat. As a result, such studies have
been met with criticism by the privacy community [40].
Toward safe Tor measurement. There has been an
exciting recent trend in the literature that proposes dif-
ferentially private [21] statistics collection techniques
for anonymity networks such as Tor. Systems such as
PrivEx [23], PrivCount [27], HisTor [36], and PSC [24]
enable useful statistics collection while providing for-
mal guarantees about the privacy risks they impose
on the network’s users. However, to date, researchers
have (rightfully) focused on developing these privacy-
preserving measurement techniques rather than on per-
forming exhaustive measurements of deployed anonymity
networks such as Tor.
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Our Contributions. This paper presents the largest
and most comprehensive measurement study of the Tor
network to date, performed using newly proposed differ-
entially private statistics collection techniques. To con-
duct our study, we modify Tor and significantly enhance
and improve PrivCount [27] and PSC [24] (described in
more detail in the following section) to support a larger
variety of measurements, and contribute our improve-
ments to the respective open source projects. We run 16
Tor relays that contribute approximately 3.5% of Tor’s
bandwidth capacity, and deploy our measurement sys-
tems across these relays in order to safely collect mea-
surements of the live Tor network. We extend previ-
ous statistical methodology to enable unique-counting
on Tor, and extend privacy definitions (action bounds)
to cover new types of user activity. We also describe
the challenges and tactics for selecting appropriate pri-
vacy parameters to ensure Tor users’ safety, as well as
methods for inferring whole-network statistics given lo-
cal observations at our relays.
Using our improved measurement tools and extended
techniques, we conduct a detailed measurement study
of Tor covering three major aspects of Tor usage: who
connects to Tor and from where do they connect; how
is Tor used and with what services and destinations do
Tor users communicate; and how many onion services
exist and how are they used. Findings from our client-
based measurements suggest that Tor has ∼8 million
daily users, which is a factor of four more than previ-
ously believed. We are the first to measure client churn
in Tor, and we find that Tor user IPs turn over almost
twice in a 4 day period. We also find that ∼40% of the
sites accessed over Tor have a torproject.org domain
name, ∼10% of the sites have an amazon.com domain
name, and ∼80% of the sites have a domain name that
is included in the Alexa top 1 million sites list. Fi-
nally, we find that ∼90% of onion address lookups fail
because the address is missing or the request is mal-
formed, and more than 90% of attempted connections
to onion services fail because the server never completes
its side of the connection protocol. Our findings both re-
inforce existing beliefs about the Tor network (e.g., that
the vast majority of its use is for web browsing) and
elucidate many aspects of the Tor network that have
previously not been explored. In some instances, our
measurements—which are based on direct observations
of behavior on Tor—suggest that existing heuristically-
driven estimates of Tor’s usage (including the number
of Tor users) are highly inaccurate.
Limiting the risk to Tor’s users was paramount in
both the design and implementation of all of our mea-
surements, and a significant contribution of this work
is the methodology for choosing system parameters to
guarantee adequate levels of protection. We discuss the
precautions we took to ensure user safety, argue for the
ethical validity of our study, and describe our experi-
ences with institutional ethics boards and an indepen-
dent safety review board.
2. BACKGROUND
We begin by presenting a brief overview of Tor and
reviewing the privacy definitions and privacy-preserving
measurement tools we use in our study.
2.1 Tor
Tor provides anonymous TCP connections through
source-routed paths that originate at the Tor client (i.e.,
the user) and traverse through (usually) three relays.
Traffic enters the Tor network through guard relays.
Middle relays carry traffic from guard relays to exit
relays, where the traffic exits the anonymity network.
These anonymous paths through Tor relays are called
circuits. The unit of transport in Tor circuits is the cell:
Tor cells carry encrypted routing information and 498
bytes of data [17]. The encryption of application-level
headers and payloads makes it difficult for an adversary
to perform traffic analysis on circuits and learn the end-
points or content of communication.
Tor has a three-tiered communication architecture.
A single circuit may carry multiple streams. A Tor
stream is a logical connection between the client and
a single destination (e.g., a webserver), and is roughly
analogous to a standard TCP connection. A request to
retrieve a webpage may produce several streams (e.g.,
to example.com and ads.example.com) that are mul-
tiplexed over a single circuit. Finally, Tor maintains
longstanding TLS-encrypted connections between re-
lays that are adjacent on some Tor circuit. Communica-
tion belonging to different circuits that share a common
hop between two relays are multiplexed through a sin-
gle connection. Similarly, a user’s Tor client maintains
a single connection to each of its guards, through which
multiple circuits (and streams) may be formed.
Tor clients periodically download “directory updates”
that describe the consensus view of the network. Clients
send all user data through one guard by default, but
directory updates are obtained through three guards
by default. Tor clients avoiding censorship may connect
to the network through bridges [37], which are guards
whose identities are not public and are disseminated by
Tor to users requesting them.
Onion services. Tor allows services to hide their loca-
tions through the use of onion services [42]. As a special
(but common) case, when the onion service corresponds
to a hidden website, we refer to it as an onionsite.
To operate an onion service, the operator selects six
relays to serve as introduction points. It then (1) con-
structs an onion service descriptor that contains its
public key and the identities of the chosen introduc-
tion points, and (2) forms Tor circuits to each of the
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introduction points. The descriptor is then stored on
six or eight relays [9] (depending on Tor version) us-
ing a distributed hash table (DHT) [32]. These relays
are called onion service directories (for historical rea-
sons, they are also called “hidden service directories”
or “HSDirs”). The DHT is indexed by the descriptor
ID, which is derived from the public key. The address
of the service is a domain with an .onion suffix, which
is derived from the public key.
When a user wishes to access the onion service, it
queries the DHT to obtain the service’s onion descrip-
tor, which includes the identities of its introduction
points. It also chooses a relay to serve as a rendezvous
point (RP), and constructs a circuit to this RP. Using
the public key in the onion descriptor, the user encrypts
its choice of the RP and sends it via a Tor circuit to one
of the onion service’s introduction points. This choice is
then forwarded to the onion service, using the existing
circuit between the introduction point and the service.
Finally, the onion service constructs a circuit to the RP,
through which it can communicate with the user.
Importantly, Tor conceals the network locations of
both the user and the onion service. The communica-
tions between the user and the introduction point, the
user and the RP, the onion service and the introduction
point, and the onion service and the RP are all carried
over Tor circuits.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [21] is a privacy definition that
provides strong guarantees about how much is revealed
by answering database queries. Differential privacy is
defined in terms of pairs of adjacent databases and guar-
antees that query responses cannot be used to distin-
guish such pairs. Typically, databases that differ only
in a single user’s data are considerd adjacent, and then
the definition ensures that query responses don’t reveal
much about any user.
Differential privacy has previously been proposed as a
means to safely study the Tor network [23,24,27,36]. In
existing work, as in this study, adjacency is defined by
network activity rather than by user. For example, in
its study of visits to censored sites, PrivEx defines ad-
jacency as differing by at most six exit connections per
hour [23]. Under this definition of adjacency, differential
privacy’s guarantees apply to connections rather than-
users. We also adopt this model and consider privacy
protections over particular user activities (for example,
visiting onion sites) conducted over a fixed length of
time rather than on a per-user basis. The latter is dif-
ficult to achieve, since conceptually, a single user (e.g.,
a botnet) could constitute a significant fraction of the
activity on the network.
Differential privacy is typically achieved by adding
noise to query results. This noise is added in a con-
trolled manner such that the result of the query is nearly
the same for adjacent databases. More formally, a (δ, )-
differentially private mechanism [20] is an algorithmM
such that for all adjacent databases D1 and D2 and all
S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ
where δ and  are parameters that can be used to trade
off between privacy and accuracy.
2.3 PrivCount
PrivCount [27] is a distributed measurement system
that provides (, δ)-differentially private statistics about
the Tor network.
A PrivCount deployment consists of three compo-
nents: a tally server (TS), at least one data collector
(DC), and at least one share keeper (SK). In an ex-
ecution of PrivCount, the TS, DCs, and SKs act col-
lectively to report (noisy) counts of the events that
were observed during a collection period. PrivCount
supports both single number queries (e.g., “how many
clients connected during the collection period?”) and
multiple-counter queries (e.g., “how many Tor connec-
tions went to {Google, Amazon, Facebook} during the
collection period?”) in which the “bins” (i.e., counters)
are independent. PrivCount is shown to provide (, δ)-
differential privacy if (1) at least one SK is honest.
2.4 Private Set-union Cardinality (PSC)
PrivCount provides a safe method of counting ob-
served events across a set of Tor relays. A limitation of
PrivCount (and one shared by other privacy-preserving
measurement systems [23, 36]) is that it cannot deter-
mine the count of distinct values among the DCs. For
example, while PrivCount can answer queries such as
“how many client connections were observed?”, it can-
not answer “how many unique clients connected to Tor?”
To answer questions about the count of distinct val-
ues, we use the private set-union cardinality (PSC) pro-
tocol introduced by Fenske et al. [24]. In PSC, each DC
k maintains a set of items Ik. PSC computes the cardi-
nality of the union of those itemsets; i.e., |⋃k Ik|+noise.
PSC achieves (, δ)-differential privacy, and does not ex-
pose any element of any itemset to an adversary.
The participants in PSC include one or more DCs
and one or more computation parties (CPs), the latter
of which perform a series of noise additions, verifiable
shuffles, re-randomizations, and aggregation to compute
the final cardinality (plus noise) of the union.
3. METHODOLOGY
Conducting safe measurements on Tor requires care-
ful experimentation design, configuration, and deploy-
ment. In what follows, we describe the methodology we
3
employ to collect and analyze measurements of the Tor
network.
3.1 Deployment
We use several Tor relays and both PrivCount and
PSC to conduct Tor measurements. We first enhanced
the PrivCount version of Tor1 so that the PrivCount
events that Tor emits include additional information
about connections, circuits, and streams as necessary
to answer our research questions. We also add new
events that report onion service directory usage infor-
mation [9,10]. We ran 16 Tor relays with our enhanced
version of Tor (6 exit relays and 11 non-exit relays).
We then enhance PrivCount to support the new in-
formation it receives from Tor, and to support several
new counter types as necessary for our study. Most
significantly, we add support for counting set member-
ship using PrivCount histograms which we use to mea-
sure domain distribution (§4), geopolitical distribution
in (§5), and onion site distribution in (§6). We also sig-
nificantly extend PSC: we slightly modify the original
PSC design to include a TS to coordinate the actions of
the DCs and CPs, we engineer PSC to collect the Priv-
Count events emitted by our relays, and we add sup-
port for measuring the number of unique domains (§4),
clients (§5), and onion sites (§6). All of our enhance-
ments have been merged into the PrivCount and PSC
open-source projects.
We set up a PrivCount deployment containing 1 TS,
3 SKs, and 16 DCs (one for each Tor relay), and we set
up a PSC deployment containing 1 TS, 3 CPs, and 16
DCs. We use PrivCount and PSC to repeatedly mea-
sure Tor in 24 hour periods, where each period focuses
on measuring a small set of statistics. During some
measurement periods, we use only the subset of the DCs
and relays that are in a position to observe the events
of interest in order to reduce operator overhead and
reduce the likelihood of failure. Apart from the cases
where server(s) was temporarily unavailable, the num-
ber of CPs/ SKs we use is greater than or equal to the
number of relay operators in all our measurements. To
maintain our privacy guarantees, PrivCount and PSC
measurements are never conducted in parallel, and we
always enforce at least 24 hours of delay between any
sequential measurement of distinct statistics.
3.2 Privacy
We protect the privacy of individual Tor users using
the methodology developed with PrivCount [27]. This
approach applies differential privacy to protect a certain
amount of network activity within a certain length of
time. Limiting the application of differential privacy to
bounded amounts of activity is required for producing
accurate results, as otherwise we must protect a hypo-
1https://github.com/privcount/tor
thetical individual whose activity constitutes the ma-
jority of network activity, which would necessarily yield
inaccurate results. Fortunately, reasonable Tor activity
by an individual should for most actions constitute a
small fraction of the total network activity, and so we
can provide privacy while providing accurate network
measurements.
Our publishing mechanisms formally apply (, δ) dif-
ferential privacy to the space of inputs that includes
all possible network traces in a given time period. In-
puts are considered “adjacent” if they differ only in the
activity of a single user within a given length of time,
and all differences in that activity stay within a set of
action bounds. We use 24 hours as the length of time
defining adjacency, and our action bounds are shown in
Table 1. One way to understand the privacy guarantee
that results is that, for any two reasonable sequences of
network actions that a user could perform in a 24-hour
period, including nothing at all, they most likely can-
not be distinguished based on the statistics published
by our mechanisms.
We derive the action bounds by considering reason-
able activities that a Tor user might perform over 24
hours. In this analysis, we consider protecting the pri-
vacy of both Tor clients and onion services. We take into
account how certain type of user actions would trans-
late into observable actions on the Tor network, such as
creating new circuits or sending data cells, based on our
understanding of the Tor protocol and software, taking
into account features such as caching and how streams
are assigned to circuits. We consider several types of
common Tor activities in this analysis: web browsing
with Tor Browser, chat with the Ricochet P2P onion
service [6], and running a Web server as an onionsite.
We compute the amount of network actions that re-
sult from reasonable amounts of these activities and use
the maximum to define the action bound. The activity
that provides the maximum value defining each bound
is shown in the final column of Table 1.
For example, we choose to protect connecting to 20
domains through an exit circuit, which would protect
browsing two new websites for each of 10 hours per
day, as the other activities (i.e., chat and onionsites)
would not create domain connections. This analysis
also allows for additional page loads within the same
site, as they would be assigned to the same circuit and
thus would not be measured as a new domain connec-
tion. Note that certain observable actions apply to all
Tor activities, such as creating a TCP connection to a
guard, and thus have no defining activity.
We use privacy parameters  = 0.3 and δ = 10−11.
The value of  is the same one used by Tor to protect
its onion-service statistics [30]. We choose δ such that
if there are n Tor users, then δ/n is still small, which
ensures that each user is simultaneously protected [22].
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Table 1: Action bounds for measurements.
Action
Daily
bound
Defining
activity
Connect to domain 20 domains Web
Send or receive
exit data
400 MB Web
Connect to Tor
from new IP address
1 day: 4 IPs
2+ days: 3 IPs
N/A
Create TCP
connection to Tor
12 connections N/A
Create circuit
through entry guard
651 circuits Chat
Send or receive
entry data
407 MB Web
Upload descriptor 450 uploads Onionsite
Upload descriptor of
new onion address
3 addresses Onionsite
Fetch descriptor 30 fetches Onionsite
Create rendezvous
connection
180 connections Chat
Send or receive
rendezvous data
400 MB
Web or
onionsite
For example, with n = 10−6 then δ/n = 10−5.
3.3 Statistical Analysis
Our measurement techniques do not give us a com-
plete and exact view of the total amount of activity
in the Tor network. Because we make measurements
from a small subset relays, we only observe a sam-
ple of Tor’s overall activity. In addition, our privacy-
preserving techniques intentionally include some ran-
dom errors in the measurement. We use statistical tech-
niques to overcome these limitations.
The count measurements (i.e., those made using Priv-
Count) include noise generated according to a normal
distribution with mean zero and known variance. Thus
for those measurements we compute confidence inter-
vals (CIs) that include the true value with 95% prob-
ability. Moreover, for many values we wish to infer a
network-wide total from our sample. We do so by divid-
ing the reported values (and their CIs) by the fraction of
the observations that our measuring relays make. For
example, we measure 32 million streams using relays
that comprise 1.5% of the exit weight and including
added noise with a standard deviation of 3.1 million.
We infer (3.2e7± 6.2e6)/0.015 = 2.1e9± 4.1e8 streams
in the entire network, where the range provides a 95%
confidence interval.
The unique-count measurements (i.e., those made us-
ing PSC) include noise generated according to a bino-
mial distribution with known parameters. In addition,
hash-table collisions (which can occur within PSC’s in-
ternal data storage [24]) can cause the measured value
to be smaller than the true value. We adjust for these
errors by computing 95% confidence intervals using an
exact algorithm based on dynamic programming.
Extrapolating unique counts from our sample to the
entire network can be a challenge. Unlike with standard
counts, we need to know if the same items in our sample
are seen elsewhere or not. For example, when counting
unique domains it could be that the domains we count
are each visited very frequently and thus are observed
by all relays, which would indicate that our sample
count is the same as the network-wide count. In several
cases, we can handle this using other information we
have about the frequency distribution of the observed
items. For example, there is evidence that domains are
visited following a power-law distribution [13, 33]. We
also make some additional measurements to help deter-
mine likely parameters for these distributions. We can
then construct confidence intervals for the network-wide
unique counts by considering the probability of our lo-
cal counts given different possible values for the overall
count. We use Monte-Carlo simulations to determine
these probabilities for more complicated distributions.
Note that in some cases we cannot identify a likely fre-
quency distribution. In these cases, with an observed
value of x and a fraction p of all observations, we sim-
ply present the range of likely network-wide values to
be [x, x/p], where the lower end of the range covers the
possibility that each item is frequently and the upper
end covers the possibility of infrequent observations per
item.
4. EXIT MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we present results and analyses of exit
measurements taken from relays in a position to observe
Tor’s egress traffic.
4.1 Overview
Recall from §2.1 that Tor clients build circuits through
a sequence of Tor relays over which they multiplex mul-
tiple streams. Each stream is associated with a TCP
connection between an exit relay and a user-specified
destination and is used to transfer data between that
TCP connection and the client. For each stream, the
client specifies a destination hostname or IP address
which the exit relay requires in order to create a TCP
connection on the client’s behalf.
To better understand which web domains Tor users
frequently visit, we instrument PrivCount and PSC to
count the initial streams that are created on circuits
(i.e., the first stream for each circuit) given that a host-
name was provided in the stream by the client and
the destination port requested by the client is a web
port (either 80 or 443). We focus on initial streams
because the Tor Browser uses a new circuit for each
unique domain shown in the browser address bar. The
initial stream on a circuit will therefore most directly
indicate the user’s intended destination, whereas sub-
sequent streams that are created when loading a page
to fetch embedded resources (e.g., images, scripts, etc.)
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Figure 1: The number of streams of various types over 24 hours
in Tor inferred from our exit relay observations, including 95%
confidence intervals. In each sub-figure, the left bar shows the
category total and the right stacked bar shows the breakdown of
that category into more specific subcategories.
provide less useful indications of user intent. Second,
we focus on streams that provide hostnames rather than
IPv4 or IPv6 addresses because hostnames can be mapped
to web domains much more easily than IP addresses. Fi-
nally, we are interested in web domains and so we do not
measure domains on streams that request connection to
destination ports not traditionally associated with web
content.
4.2 Exit Stream Analysis
We first measure and analyze the breakdown of
streams that provide a hostname and web port, com-
pared to other types of streams. These measurements
provide useful Tor usage information and also provide
context about the overall fraction of Tor exit traffic that
our domain measurements will cover.
Our PrivCount stream measurements were conducted
between 2018-01-04 and 2018-01-05 during which the
mean combined exit weight of our measurement relays
(taken over the consensuses that were active during
the measurement) was 1.5% of the total available exit
weight in Tor. We infer the number of streams of var-
ious types over a 24 hour period in the entire Tor net-
work using the observations from our relays and our
fractional weight. The inferred values are shown in Fig-
ure 1 with 95% confidence intervals. Figure 1a shows
that there are about 2 billion exit streams created in
Tor in 24 hours, and only about 5% of those streams
represent a circuit’s first stream. Figure 1b shows that
an insignificant number of these initial streams include
an IPv4 or IPv6 address: our measured values for these
stream subcategories were negative (due to the added
noise) and therefore the most likely value of the counters
is zero. Figure 1c similarly shows that an insignificant
number of initial streams containing a hostname target
a non-web port (i.e., a port other than 80 or 443). Our
results confirm that almost all initial streams provide
hostnames and target a web port; the domain measure-
ments that we describe next will focus on the hostnames
provided in these streams.
4.3 Exit Domains
We now describe the results from our measurements
of the number of domains observed in initial streams
that also provide a hostname and a web port. To ease
presentation, we refer to the measured values as primary
domains or domains in the remainder of this section.
Across our measurements, we construct sets of domain
names and increment a counter for a set whenever we
observe a primary domain that matches a domain name
in that set.
Alexa Top Sites. We use the Alexa top 1 millions sites
list [2] to help us understand which sites are visited by
Tor users. We conducted two related PrivCount mea-
surements. In the Alexa rank measurement, we sorted
the sites by rank and split them into six sets of increas-
ing size: set i = 0 contains the first 101 sites and set
i > 0 contains the first 10i+1 sites excluding those in
set i−1. We used a separate set for torproject.org since
early measurements revealed a significant number of ac-
cesses to that domain. The Alexa rank measurement
was conducted between 2018-01-31 and 2018-02-01, dur-
ing which our combined mean exit weight was 2.2%.
In the Alexa siblings measurement, we created a set
for each of the top 10 sites in the Alexa list. For each
such site we stripped the top level domain to produce
a site basename (e.g., google), and then added all en-
tries from the top 1 million sites list that contained the
basename into the corresponding set. We also used dis-
tinct sets for duckduckgo (rank 342, the default search
engine in Tor Browser) and torproject (rank 10,244, de-
veloper of Tor Browser). As a result of this process, the
google set (rank 1) was the largest (212 sites, includ-
ing the rank 7 site google.co.in), while the reddit (rank
8) and qq (rank 9) sets were the smallest among top 10
sites containing 3 sites each (duckduckgo and torproject
contained 1 site each). The Alexa siblings measurement
was conducted between 2018-02-01 and 2018-02-02, dur-
ing which our combined mean exit weight was 2.1%.
The results from the Alexa rank and Alexa siblings
measurements are shown in Figure 2. We highlight
three observations from these results. First, we ob-
served torproject.org in 40.1% (CI: [39.9; 40.3]%) and
39.0% (CI: [38.8; 39.2]%) of primary domains. Sur-
prised by this result, we conducted additional measure-
ments and observed the domain onionoo.torproject.org
in 43.4% (CI: [43.1; 43.7]%) of primary domains. Onionoo
is a web service that provides other applications with
access to Tor network status information. We contacted
the Onionoo maintainers from The Tor Project, but we
were unable to identify a clear reason for the high num-
ber of accesses to Onionoo from Tor.
Second, we observed sites in the amazon siblings set
for 9.7% (CI: [9.5; 9.9]%) of primary domains, and sites
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Figure 2: Results of PrivCount measurements of the frequency
of membership of primary domains in subsets of the Alexa top 1
million sites list. The top plot shows subsets containing domains
that are sorted by Alexa rank, and the bottom plot shows subsets
containing domains of each of the top 10 sites as well as their
siblings.
in the google siblings set for 2.4% (CI: [2.2; 2.6]%) pri-
mary domains. To further explain the unexpectedly
high amazon result, we conducted an additional mea-
surement during which we observed www.amazon.com
in 8.6% (CI: [8.3; 8.9]%) of primary domains. We con-
tacted Amazon employees but again were unable to find
the reason for the relatively high number of accesses
from Tor (here, due to lack of response).
Third, we observed that domains in the Alexa top
sites list accounted for about 80% of all primary do-
mains accessed from Tor, and that the smaller but more
highly ranked domain sets have roughly equal frequency
as the increasingly larger but more lowly ranked sets.
We conclude from these results that the Alexa top sites
list provides a reasonable representation of destinations
visited by Tor users. The Alexa top sites list is often
used as a destination model in Tor research, and most
significantly in Tor website fingerprinting research [28].
Our results provide confirmation that using the top sites
list as part of Tor research is appropriate.
Alexa Categories. We conducted a PrivCount mea-
surement of primary domains by category (e.g., news,
science, sports, etc.) using Alexa category lists [3] which
are limited to 50 sites per category. The measurement
was conducted between 2018-01-29 and 2018-01-30, dur-
ing which our mean combined exit weight was 2.1%.
Additional insights from the measurement beyond those
already presented are limited: the category containing
amazon.com accounted for 7.6% (CI: [7.4; 7.8]%) of pri-
mary domains while 90.6% (CI: [90.3; 90.9]%) category
(torproject.org was not in any of the categories).
Top-Level Domains. We measured the frequency with
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Figure 3: Results of PrivCount measurements of the frequency
of membership of primary domains in top-level domain subsets
constructed from all sites and from those sites present in the
Alexa top 1 million sites list.
which all top-level domain (TLD) names that are con-
tained in more than 104 entries in the Alexa top 1 mil-
lion sites list also appeared in the observed primary do-
mains. The measured TLDs include three main TLDs
(.com, .org, and .net) as well as 11 country-specific
TLDs. We conducted two related PrivCount TLD mea-
surements, one in which we count the TLDs of all pri-
mary domains using wildcards (conducted between 2018-
02-02 and 2018-02-03 with 2.4% exit weight), and one
in which we count the TLDs of only those primary do-
mains that appear in the Alexa list (conducted between
2018-01-30 and 2018-01-31 with 2.3% exit weight). We
measured torproject.org using a separate counter dur-
ing the Alexa measurement, but our implementation
of wildcard matching restricted us from doing so when
measuring all sites.
The TLD measurement results are shown in Figure 3.
Unsurprisingly, the three main TLDs make up the ma-
jority of the primary domains accessed by Tor users,
though we note that .org would account for a signifi-
cantly smaller fraction of domains without torproject.org.
We found that the Russian TLD .ru accounted for 2.8%
(CI: [2.6; 3.0]%) and 2.4% (CI: [2.2; 2.6]%) of country-
specific TLDs, the largest observed by our relays. We
also found that ∼11% of .com, ∼3% of .org, and ∼4%
of .net sites accessed in primary domains are not in
the Alexa top sites list. Only 7.9% (CI: [7.7; 8.1]%) of
TLDs from all primary domains did not match one of
the TLDs that we measured, which increased to 26.1%
(CI: [25.9; 26.3]%) of TLDs for primary domains in the
Alexa top 1 million sites list.
Second-Level Domains. We conducted two mea-
surements of the number of unique second-level domain
(SLD) names that we observed in Tor primary domains.
7
Table 2: Locally observed unique second level domain statistics
measured using PSC.
Statistic Count 95% CI
SLDs 471,228 [470,357; 472,099]
Alexa SLDs 35,660 [34,789; 37,393]
During both these measurements, we use only 5 out of
our 6 exit relays (1.24% mean exit weight) in order to
reduce operator overhead. We summarize our results in
Table 2. In the first measurement, we measured the
number of unique SLD names among those Tor pri-
mary domains which contain a TLD in the public suf-
fix list [5]. From a measurement conducted between
2018-03-31 and 2018-04-01, we find that 471,228 (CI:
[470,357; 472,099]) unique SLDs were accessed through
our exits. We also measured the number of unique
Alexa top 1 million SLDs (i.e. the SLDs of Alexa top 1
million sites) among those Tor primary domains. From
a measurement conducted between 2018-03-24 and 2018-
03-25, we infer that 35,660 (CI: [34,789; 37,393]) of such
unique SLDs were accessed through our exits. From
these results, we find that the unique count of accessed
SLDs is more than ten times that of the unique count
of Alexa top one million sites. From our measurements,
we conclude that a long tail exists in the distribution of
sites accessed over Tor.
To extrapolate the unique second-level domain mea-
surements for the entire Tor network, we need to know
the distribution of SLDs as seen by the exits. From
previous research studies, we know that domains are
visited following a power-law distribution [13, 33]. But
we need additional measurements to determine the ex-
ponent of this power-law distribution. Therefore, we
perform a series of simulations of clients visiting ran-
dom destination sites (based on power-law distribution
with random exponents) and construct confidence inter-
vals for the network-wide unique SLD counts. We use
the locally observed unique SLDs count as a self-check.
This method appears to work well for the unique
Alexa top 1 million SLDs. The results of 100 simula-
tions reveals an inferred network-wide unique count of
513,342 (CI: [512,760; 514,693]) accesses to the Alexa
top 1 million list. That is, slightly more than half of the
Alexa top sites are accessed over Tor over 24 hours. Un-
fortunately, the inability to closely fit SLD accesses to
a distribution prevented us from using this approach to
extrapolate the number of network-wide SLD accesses.
5. CLIENT MEASUREMENTS
We conducted a number of measurements to better
understand who uses Tor and to determine how many
users access the network.
5.1 Tor Connections and Clients
We first measure the number of client connections
using our PrivCount deployment. Over the 24 hour
measurement period beginning on 2018-04-07, the mean
probability of selecting our relays in the entry position
was 0.0144. Since clients typically choose their guards
according to guard weights, we can project our local
PrivCount measurements to infer Tor-wide results by
dividing our observed counts by 0.0144. We summarize
our results in Table 4.
The amount of daily data being transferred across
Tor is 517 TiB (CI: [504; 530] TiB), which represents
the sum of client uploads and downloads. We note that
this includes Tor cell overheads, so the actual amount
of client payload data transferred would be 2-3% less.
We find that there are about 148 million (CI: [143;
153] million) client connections, through which 1,286
million client circuits (CI: [1,246; 1,326] million) are
multiplexed, per day, across the Tor network. This is
significantly higher than the 80.6 million client connec-
tions reported by Jansen and Johnson [27] two years
ago. We suspect that the discrepancy is due to ongoing
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that began
affecting the Tor network back in December 2017 [25].
Tor Clients. We next consider the number of unique
clients access the Tor network. Here, we use PSC to
safely capture the approximate number of clients ob-
served by our guard relays. Unlike existing work that
also attempts to quantify the number of Tor users [15,
27, 35, 38], we do not store (even temporarily) IP ad-
dresses since PSC uses oblivious counters. Similar to
previous studies, we assume that there is a one-to-one
mapping between client IPs and unique Tor clients, al-
though this may be violated, for example, by mobile
users with changing IP addresses or by clients behind
Network Address Translation (NAT). In addition, we
count bridges as clients, as their identities are private.
We use PSC to collect data from our relays that have
a non-zero guard probability, for a 24 hour period be-
ginning on 2018-04-14 during which our guards had a
combined weight of 1.19%. Measurement results are re-
ported in Table 5. We observe over 313 thousand unique
client IPs using our guards (this experiment used two
CPs due to the temporary unavailability of one). This is
a surprisingly high number, given that Tor Metrics [43]
(using a very different and unvalidated estimation tech-
nique) reports 2.15 million clients per day in April 2018
for the entire Tor network. We would expect a typical
client to connect to three guards (clients currently use
one guard for data but two additional guards for direc-
tory updates [8]), and so we would expect to see closer
to 0.0119× 3× 2.15e6 = 76, 755 unique clients IPs. To
the extent that each unique IP observed in a 24-hour
period represents a new user, this suggests that Tor is
underestimating its total number of users by a factor
of 4, and the total number of daily users is closer to
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313, 213/0.0119/3 ≈ 8, 773, 473.
To better understand the network-wide number of
unique client IPs in Tor, we perform additional PSC
measurements using sets of relays of different sizes. We
can then compare how the count grows with the mea-
suring set to its predicted growth under different client
models to identify the most likely model. In particular
we would like to validate a model of how many guards
each client contacts, which we expect to typically be
3, but could be less or more for several reasons, includ-
ing guard/exit conflicts, multiple clients behind a single
NAT IP, Tor bridges serving many clients, and tor2web
instances [12]. We made two 24-hour measurements,
one starting on 2018-05-12 using DCs with 0.42% of
the guard weight and the other starting on 2018-05-13
using a disjoint set of DCs with 0.88% of the guard
weight. We counted 148,174 (CI: [148, 161] thousand)
and 269,795 (CI: [269, 315] thousand) unique client IPs
during these measurements, respectively. Observe that
the latter number is significantly smaller than we would
expect if client contacted only one guard, in which case
we would predict 148, 174×(0.88/0.42) ≈ 310, 460. This
indicates that indeed client IPs typically connect to
multiple guards.
To identify the number of guards that typical client
IPs connect to, we consider a range of guards per client
and analyze the resulting consistency with our measure-
ments. Let g denote the number of guards each client
connects to in the model. We use simulation to extrap-
olate from our two measurements two separate confi-
dence intervals for the network-wide unique client IP
counts. We discover that these CIs are disjoint unless
g is in the range [27, 34]. This is a much higher value
of g than should be the case for typical clients, and we
believe that this indicates that this is a poor model of
how clients connect to guards. It does imply, however,
that there are some clients IPs that are connected to
many more guards than is typical.
Thus we consider a refinement on this model in which
a set of “promiscuous” clients connect to all guards in
a 24-hour period, and the remaining “selective” clients
connect to g guards only. The promiscuous clients cap-
ture the likely behavior of Tor bridges, tor2web clients,
and clients behind a NAT IP. We then determine a range
for the number p of promiscuous clients by consider-
ing values of g that are likely given our understanding
of the Tor protocol: g ∈ {3, 4, 5} (all clients should
connect to 3 guards for directory updates, some clients
may connect to 1 or 2 more due to guard churn). For
each of these values of g, there were some values for
the number p of promiscuous clients that was consis-
tent with our two client-IP measurements, that is, that
yielded a non-empty intersection of the two CIs. Table 3
shows these ranges, which indicates about 14–22 thou-
sand promiscuous clients. Observe that bridges alone
Table 3: Network-wide promiscuous clients and client IPs
Guards per
client
Promiscuous
clients 95% CI
Network-wide
client IPs 95% CI
3 [15,856; 21,522] [10,851,783; 11,240,709]
4 [15,129; 21,056] [8,195,072; 8,493,863]
5 [14,428; 20,451] [6,605,713; 6,849,612]
Table 4: Network-wide client usage statistics, inferred from Priv-
Count measurements.
Statistic Count 95% CI
Data (TiB) 517 ± [504; 530]
Connections (×106) 148 ± [143; 153]
Circuits (×106) 1,286 ± [1,246; 1,326]
seem unlikely to make up this population, as this range
is much larger than the 1640 bridges reported by Tor
Metrics at the time of our measurements, and in April
2016 Matic et al. [37] only discovered 50% more bridges
than reported by Tor Metrics. Table 3 also shows con-
fidence intervals for the number of network-wide client
IPs, calculated for each g as the union of CIs over all p in
the range shown. For what we believe is the most likely
number of guards per selective client (g = 3), our mea-
surements indicate about 11 million unique client IPs
network-wide, which suggests a true value over 5 times
the number of users estimated by Tor Metrics. Even for
g = 5, the range suggests over 3 times as many daily
users as Tor currently estimates.
Client churn. Tor clients may go offline, and we expect
that the Tor network experiences a high degree of client
churn. Using PSC, we recorded the count of unique
client IPs over a four-day period beginning on 2018-
05-15. We observed 672,303 (CI: [671,781; 1,118,147])
unique client IPs. Comparing this result with our one-
day measurement (see Table 5), we can conclude that
the client churn rate is 119,697 (CI: [119,581; 247,268])
client IPs per day. We can infer similar network-wide
behavior i.e.client IPs turn over almost twice over a
four-day period.
5.2 Client Composition and Diversity
We additionally explore the geopolitical distribution
of Tor clients. We resolve each client IP address to
its host country using the MaxMind GeoLite2 coun-
try database, and use PrivCount to count the num-
ber of client connections, bytes transferred, and cir-
cuits created, broken down by country. For most of
the world’s 250 countries, we were unable to determine
useful counts since the added noise (to achieve differen-
tial privacy) overwhelm the actual count. We show the
countries with significant inferred counts in Figure 4.
The United States (US), Russia (RU), and Germany
(DE) have both the greatest client connection counts
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Figure 4: Tor per country client usage statistics inferred from PrivCount measurements - the counts of client connections (left), amount
of client data transferred (center), and the counts of client circuits (right). Error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.
Table 5: Locally observed unique client statistics measured using
PSC.
Statistic Count 95% CI
IPs 313,213 [313,039; 376,343]
Countries 203 [141; 250]
ASes 11,882 [11,708; 12,053]
IPs (4-day) 672,303 [671,781; 1,118,147]
Churn 119,697/day [119,581; 247,268]/day
and data transfer amounts (see Figure 4, left and cen-
ter). Assuming that the distribution of client connec-
tion counts reflects the distribution of client usage, we
can surmise that these three countries use Tor the most.
Interestingly, our results disagree with those from the
Tor Metrics Portal, which ranks the United Arab Emi-
rates (UAE) as contributing the second largest number
of Tor users; in contrast, we did not find the UAE to
be among the most significant contributors. Although
we cannot fully explain this discrepancy, we are some-
what skeptical of the Tor Metric Portal’s results: the
value reported by the Tor Metrics Portal implies that
nearly 4% of the entire population of the UAE accesses
Tor on a daily basis, which seems unlikely. However, al-
though the UAE has neither a significant client connec-
tion count nor client data transferred, it ranks sixth in
the number of client circuits (see Figure 4, right; marked
as “AE”). One intriguing possibility is that the majority
of the Tor clients from the UAE are partially blocked
from using Tor: while they are able to construct direc-
tory circuits (recall that Tor’s user statistics are esti-
mated from the number of directory requests), they are
prevented from establishing regular Tor circuits, caus-
ing the Tor software to repeatedly perform directory
fetches. We leave the exploration of this strange Tor
client behavior in the UAE as a future research direc-
tion.
To determine whether Tor has a global userbase, we
use PSC to count the number of unique countries from
which clients originate. Since the actual count can only
be at most 250 (i.e., the total number of countries
worldwide), invariably the differentially private noise
overwhelms the actual count. Therefore to reduce the
effect of noise, we average the country counts between
two consecutive one-day measurements, beginning on
2018-05-09. We find that clients from 203 (CI: [141;
250]) different countries access Tor. Comparing our re-
sults to earlier studies from McCoy et al. [38] (2008) and
Chaabane et al. [15] (from 2010) that report clients from
approximately 125 countries, we can conclude that the
locations from which Tor is accessed has significantly
diversified in the past decade.
We were unable to extrapolate the unique country
count for the entire Tor network since the frequency
distribution of the countries, as seen by the guards, is
difficult to determine. However, we can still roughly
estimate the range of network-wide values to be [141,
250], where the lower bound is the least possible ob-
served count and the upper bound is the total number
of countries that exists worldwide.
Network Diversity. We also measure the network di-
versity of Tor users by mapping each client IP address
to its autonomous system (AS) using the IPv4 and IPv6
datasets (dated 26th November 2017) from CAIDA [7].
Using PSC, we first measure the unique AS count of
the client IPs, for a 24 hour period beginning on 2018-
04-18. We observe clients from about 11,882 ASes (CI:
[11,708; 12,053])—approximately 20% of the number of
defined ASes.
To extrapolate the unique AS count for the entire
Tor network, we must first identify the frequency dis-
tribution of the ASes, as seen by the guards. This is
challenging. Therefore, we present the range of most-
likely network-wide values as [11,708; 59,597], where the
lower bound is the least possible observed count and the
upper bound is the total number of ASes.
To determine whether there are “hotspot” ASes, we
also ran PrivCount and recorded counts for each of
CAIDA’s 1000 highest ranked ASes [4], where an AS’s
rank is based on the number of ASes in its customer
cone. Over the 24 hour measurement period begin-
ning on 2018-05-01, we found that none of the Top 1000
ASes had results that were statistically significant (i.e.,
clearly distinguishable from noise). Although, we did
not find any individual AS that contributes a large frac-
10
Table 6: Network-wide number of unique onion addresses in-
ferred from our HSDir PSC measurements.
Statistic Count 95% CI
Addresses published 70,826 [65,738; 76,350]
Addresses fetched 74,900 [34,363; 696,255]
tion of Tor users, we found that the ASes outside the
top 1000 have about 53% of the client connections, 52%
of the client data, and 62% of the client circuits.
6. ONION-SERVICE MEASUREMENTS
We conducted a number of measurements to deter-
mine how many Tor onion services exist, which kinds of
services are popular, and how these services are used.
6.1 Unique Onion Addresses
Recall from §2.1 that Tor onion services store their
descriptors at onion service directories (HSDirs) in a
DHT. To measure the number of unique onion services
in the Tor network, we instrument our HSDirs to report
the onion service address for each version 2 (v2) [9] de-
scriptor that is published to and fetched from the DHT.
(We don’t measure version 3 (v3) onion service descrip-
tors because the onion address is obscured using key
blinding [10].) We use the PSC deployment described
in §3.1 to safely capture the approximate number of v2
onion services observed by our HSDirs. Unlike existing
work that also attempts to quantify the number of onion
services [26,30,31,39], we avoid the need to store (even
temporarily) onion addresses, since PSC uses oblivious
counters. The results of our onion service address mea-
surements are summarized in Table 6.
Unique Onion Service Addresses Published. From
a PSC measurement conducted between 2018-04-23 and
2018-04-24 during which our mean combined HSDir pub-
lish weight was 2.75%, we observed 3,900 (CI: [3,769;
4,045]) unique v2 onion addresses in descriptors pub-
lished to our HSDirs. We extrapolate these results
based on HSDir replication to infer that the total num-
ber of unique onion service addresses published for the
entire Tor network is 70,826 (CI: [65,738; 76,350]). Ac-
cordingly, our relays observed at least 4.93% of Tor’s
unique onion addresses. Using a different extrapolation
method [26], the Tor Metrics Portal [43] estimates a to-
tal of 79 thousand unique v2 onion services published
in the Tor network at the time of our measurement.
The Tor metrics estimate does not include a confidence
interval which we expect to be significant since every
reporting relay adds noise (due to the lack of secure ag-
gregation of Tor metrics reports). Therefore, we expect
that our confidence intervals would overlap.
Unique Onion Service Addresses Fetched. From
a PSC measurement conducted between 2018-04-29 and
Table 7: Network-wide onion service descriptor statistics in-
ferred from our HSDir PrivCount measurements.
Statistic Count 95% CI
Fetched 134 million [117; 150] million
Succeeded 12.2 million [10.6; 13.7] million
Failed 121 million [103; 140] million
Fail rate 1,400 failed/s [1,192; 1,620] failed/s
Public 56.8% [36.9; 83.6]%
Unknown 47.6% [28.8; 72.7]%
2018-04-30 during which our mean combined HSDir fetch
weight was 0.534%, we observed 2,401 (CI: [1,101; 3,718])
unique v2 onion addresses in descriptors fetched from
our HSDirs. We extrapolate these results based on HS-
Dir replication to infer that the total number of unique
onion service addresses fetched for the entire Tor net-
work is 74,900 (CI: [34,363; 696,255]). By comparing
the number of unique onion addresses published and
fetched, we estimate that between 45% and 100% of ac-
tive onion services are used by clients. Note that the
Tor Metrics Portal [43] does not estimate the number
of unique onion addresses fetched by clients, and its es-
timate of the number of unique v2 onion addresses pub-
lished occasionally varies significantly (e.g., it increased
by 40 thousand during our measurement).
6.2 Onion Service Directory Usage
While the number of unique onion addresses (§6.1)
informs our understanding of how many onion services
exist, the number of descriptor actions informs our un-
derstanding of usage. Therefore, we use the PrivCount
deployment described in §3.1 to safely measure the num-
ber of v2 onion service descriptors that are fetched from
our HSDirs. We also count the number of requests for
descriptors that are not stored in the DHT, typically be-
cause the service is inactive. Our onion service descrip-
tor measurement results are summarized in Table 7.
Onion Service Descriptors Fetched. From a Priv-
Count measurement conducted between 2018-05-20 and
2018-05-21 during which our mean combined HSDir fetch
weight was 0.465%, we infer that there were a total
of 134 million (CI: [117; 150] million) v2 descriptors
fetched in the entire Tor network. Surprisingly, 90.9%
(CI: [87.8; 93.2]%) of these fetches failed, i.e., the cor-
responding descriptor was not present in the HSDir’s
cache or the request was malformed. Our results in-
dicate that there are at least 103 million failures per
day, or about 1,192 failures per second. To be sure we
did not observe a network anomaly, we conducted this
measurement multiple times and observed consistent re-
sults. We speculate that this large failure rate may be
due to botnets or onion site scanners with outdated
onion address lists. Tor’s current statistics reporting
infrastructure is unable to collect HSDir lookup fail-
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Table 8: Network-wide rendezvous statistics inferred from our
RP PrivCount measurements.
Statistic Count 95% CI
Total Circuits 366 million [351; 380] million
Succeeded 8.08% [3.47; 13.1]%
Failed: conn. closed 4.37% [0.0; 9.23]%
Failed: circuit expired 84.9% [77.0; 93.5]%
Cell payload 20.1 TiB [15.2; 24.9] TiB
Cell payload / second 2.04 Gbit/s [1.55; 2.53] Gbit/s
Cell payload / circuit 730 KiB/circ. [341; 2,070] KiB/circ.
ures [29], but we have demonstrated the feasibility of
using the PrivCount protocol to collect this statistic in
a privacy-preserving manner.
From the measurement described above, we infer that
there were a total of 12.2 million (CI: [10.6; 13.7] mil-
lion) v2 descriptors successfully fetched in the entire
Tor network. For every successful descriptor fetch, we
checked if the address was available in the latest ahmia
onion site search index [1]. We found that 56.8% (CI:
[36.9; 83.6]%) of descriptors fetched were present in the
ahmia list at the time of our measurement, while 47.6%
(CI: [28.8; 72.7]%) were not. Our results indicate that
a majority of successful onion service accesses are visits
to onion sites with publicly available addresses.
6.3 Rendezvous Point Usage
Recall from §2.1 that in order for a client to commu-
nicate with an onion service, both parties build circuits
to a relay called a rendezvous point (RP), and that this
rendezvous circuit carries all end-to-end encrypted ap-
plication payloads. While we cannot measure onion ser-
vice usage by counting streams (onion service streams
are unobservable by our RPs because data cells are end-
to-end encrypted), we can infer rendezvous circuit ac-
tivity by counting the number of cells on the circuit.
We instrument our RPs to report the number of cells
sent on v2 [9] and v3 [10] rendezvous circuits, and use
the PrivCount deployment described in §3.1 to safely
measure the approximate number of onion service ren-
dezvous circuits and cells relayed at our RPs. Table 8
summarizes the results of our RP measurements.
Rendezvous Circuit Activity. From a PrivCount
measurement conducted between 2018-05-22 and 2018-
05-23 during which our mean combined rendezvous weight
was 0.88%, we infer that there were a total of 366 mil-
lion (CI: [351; 380] million) rendezvous circuits in the
entire Tor network. Note that since a successful ren-
dezvous involves a client and service circuit, each such
rendezvous is counted as 2 circuits at the RP. Surpris-
ingly, only 8.08% (CI: [3.47; 13.1]%) of the circuits that
we observed succeeded and were active, i.e., they were
used to transfer at least one cell containing an applica-
tion payload. We found that 4.37% (CI: [0.0; 9.23]%)
of the observed rendezvous circuits failed because the
connection to the RP was closed before the service com-
pleted the rendezvous protocol, and 84.9% (CI: [77.0;
93.5]%) of the observed rendezvous circuits failed be-
cause the circuit expired (timed-out) before the service
completed the rendezvous protocol.
Rendezvous Circuit Data. From the same PrivCount
measurement as above, we infer a total of 20.1 TiB (CI:
[15.2; 24.9] TiB) of cell payload data on rendezvous cir-
cuits in the entire Tor network. Our inference corre-
sponds to a mean of 2.04 Gbit/s (CI: [1.55; 2.53] Gbit/s)
of payload data. By combining our circuit and cell ob-
servations, we calculate that the mean amount of data
per active Tor rendezvous circuit is 730 KiB (CI:[341;
2070] KiB).
7. RELATEDWORK
Several efforts have attempted to improve our under-
standing of the live Tor network. Most notably, the
Tor Project has allowed researchers to access aggregate
and longitudinal data about the Tor network through
its Tor Metrics Portal [43] since 2010, with directory
data spanning back to May 2004 [34].
Tor Metrics Portal. The Metrics Portal indirectly es-
timates the number of Tor users by counting the num-
ber of requests to the subset of Tor directory mirrors
that participate in statistics collection, and then ex-
trapolating to the entire network by dividing by the
fraction of participating directory mirrors. This tech-
nique was originally proposed by Loesing et al. [35]. In
contrast with the Tor Metrics Portal, our measurements
are based on direct observations of connecting users and
do not depend on heuristics about how often clients ac-
cess directory mirrors. (Indeed, as described in §5, our
direct measurements do not align well with the Metric
Portal’s indirect estimates.)
Towards safe Tor measurements. McCoy et al. per-
formed one of the first studies that attempted to dis-
cern how users used Tor [38]. There, the authors per-
formed packet capture at a small subset of Tor ingress
and egress points to determine the distributions of user
locations and exit traffic by port (i.e., by application).
Chaabane et al. used similar methods to examine Bit-
Torrent behavior on Tor [15]. Approaches such as these
that collect unobfuscated and potentially sensitive net-
work traces have been criticized on both ethical and
legal grounds [40,41].
There has been an increasing effort in developing tech-
niques to safely measure the Tor network. Elahi et
al. [23] were the first to propose the use of differential
privacy to provide privacy-preserving aggregate data
about Tor. Specifically, they propose two schemes known
collectively as PrivEx. PrivCount [27], which we use
in our measurements, extends the secret-sharing vari-
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ant of PrivEx by supporting repeatable measurement
phases. HisTor [36] also proposes the use of differen-
tial privacy to safely measure statistics on anonymity
networks, and adds integrity protections by bounding
the influence of malicious data collectors (DCs). How-
ever, compared to PrivCount, HisTor is limited in the
types of queries that it supports and lacks PrivCount’s
mature implementation. The private set-union cardi-
nality (PSC) protocol of Fenske et al. [24] also provides
differentially private measurements. We review differ-
ential privacy in §2.2. Sections §2.3 and §2.4 describe
PrivCount and PSC in more detail.
Understanding Onion Services. Goulet et al. [26]
describe the benefits and privacy risks of statistics col-
lection for onion services. They conclude with sugges-
tions for privacy-preserving statistics collection, includ-
ing the use of differential privacy. Their proposal partly
inspired our work, in which we use differential privacy
and other techniques [24] to conduct measurements of
onion sites. Biryukov et al. demonstrate how the design
of onion services allows an attacker to gauge the popu-
larity of an onion service and potentially deanonymize
it [14]. However, their envisioned attacks are not suit-
able for conducting privacy-preserving measurements.
Recently, Jansen et al. show how to use PrivCount to
safely measure the Tor network to discover the popular-
ity of onion services [28]. Their work focused on traffic
analysis attacks and the popularity study of a single so-
cial networking onion service. Finally, Owen and Sav-
age perform empirical measurements of Tor’s onion ser-
vices [39]. We apply similar techniques—operating Tor
relays and observing HSDir lookups—but also protect
user privacy by using differentially private techniques.
8. ETHICAL AND SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS
Statistics collection in the setting of an anonymity
network inherently carries risk since the exposure of in-
formation could degrade the privacy of the network’s
users and potentially subject them to harm. Guiding
our study were the four criteria for ethical network re-
search established by the Menlo Report [19]: we up-
hold the principle of respect for persons through the
careful and principled application of data protections,
including the use of differentially private techniques and
the avoidance of collecting personally identifiable infor-
mation (e.g., IP addresses). Following the principle of
beneficience, we balance the (low) risk of harm with the
potential benefits of the research—namely, an increased
understanding of the Tor network that could inform re-
search on improving the network’s security and perfor-
mance. Our techniques achieve the Menlo Report’s no-
tion of justice, since our statistics do not target a specific
subpopulation of Tor’s users. Finally, we achieve respect
for law and public interest through transparency in our
methods: we use open source tools [24,27] for statistics
collection and we submitted our research plan (prior to
its implementation) to several review bodies. We pre-
sented it to the Tor Research Safety Board [11], which
concluded that our plan “provides a plausible strategy
for safely measuring trends on the Tor network.”2 (Al-
though some of the authors serve on the TRSB, we
were not involved in the TRSB’s deliberations of our
research plan.) Our measurement study was approved
by the ethics board at the University of New South
Wales and certified as being exempt as non-human sub-
jects research by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at Georgetown University Additionally, aspects of this
study were discussed with members of Georgetown’s Of-
fice of General Counsel, who raised no concerns.
9. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper presents the most comprehensive privacy-
preserving measurement study of the live Tor network
to date. Our findings confirm that Tor is used predomi-
nantly for web browsing and that Tor users tend to visit
the same popular (i.e., top Alexa) sites as do ordinary
(and non-anonymous) Internet users. We observe a sur-
prisingly large number of Tor connections and unique
client IP addresses, suggesting that the heuristically-
derived estimates from the Tor Metrics Portal are sig-
nificantly underreporting Tor’s userbase. We find that
the network’s clients are highly distributed, connecting
from more than 200 countries and nearly 12,000 ASes.
These clients construct more than 1.2 billion anony-
mous circuits per day, carrying approximately 517 TiB
of data (6.1GiB/s). Unexpectedly, our measurements
show that more than 90% of onion service descriptor
fetches fail, suggesting the presence of botnets on Tor
or aggressive onion site crawlers with outdated address
lists. We report 20 TiB of data transferred daily over
circuits to onion services, representing roughly 3.9% of
all Tor traffic.
Our study does not attempt to distinguish between
human-driven and automated activity on the Tor net-
work. An intriguing open problem is the construction of
techniques to identify when measurements are heavily
influenced by automated activities (for example, when
swarms of infected hosts belonging to a botnet connect
to Tor). Indeed, the enormously high failure rate of
onion service descriptor fetches strongly suggests that
automated behavior likely does occur on Tor. Our hope
is that measurement studies such as this will help in-
form developers and security researchers of unexpected
automated activities—a necessary prerequisite to un-
derstanding and potentially defending against malicious
automated processes.
2The full text of the TRSB’s findings is available
at https://security.cs.georgetown.edu/measurement-study/
trsb-feedback.txt.
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